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ABSTRACT 
THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR TO ABSORB EMPLOYMENT       
IN RESPONSE TO THE 1997 ECONOMIC CRISIS IN INDONESIA 
By 
Parjiono 
 
While the initial impact of the economic crisis on employment was faced by a few 
sectors of the economy, the real effect gradually spread to cover almost all branches 
of the economy. It appears that the employment effect was not manifested in terms of 
persistent high unemployment, but has mostly been expressed: first, by a large 
movement of workers from manufacturing, construction, modern trade and other 
services into agriculture and possibly informal sector employment at reduced wage 
rates. Second, by an overall decline of real earning for virtually everyone, whether in 
the effected sectors or in others.   
Agricultural became a key sector to absorb employment from the job losses workers 
caused by the crisis. However, the impact of the crisis hit through reducing real wages 
and increasing living standards. It is one evidence that agricultural sector has a key 
role in the Indonesia’s macro-economy. Therefore the Government of Indonesia 
should more encourage and develop this sector through its policies. 
There are still significant policy and institutional constraints on efficient growth and 
development that must be addressed. Market reform in general are needed in 
agriculture to reduce the public burden in the face of the economic crisis, to reduce 
high distribution costs and improve allocation efficiency. They can lead to increase 
production, higher productivity, higher rural wages and employment and improve use 
of natural resources. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
The ongoing economic crisis enveloping Indonesia has dramatically reversed 
of rapid economic growth, steady progress in poverty reduction, and substantial 
improvements in food security.  Before the crisis, Indonesia was frequently cited as 
one of the highest performing Asian economies with per capita GDP growth in top 10 
percent of all developing countries. Since the crisis began in August 1997, however, 
the rupiah’s value has dropped by as much as 80 percent (before a partial recovery).  
The crisis had economic consequences, which are still unfolding. Large 
numbers of rich and poor people were adversely affected. The effect on the poor 
operated through a contraction in demand for labor and reduced transfer from 
wealthier family members, on the one hand, and through increases in commodity 
prices, especially for internationally traded goods, on the other. These problems have 
apparently been more severe in Indonesia that anywhere else. However, not all poor 
people in Indonesia were adversely affected. Some smallholder agricultural producers 
whose products are exported benefited substantially from the depreciation of the 
national currency, the rupiah. 
Related to the task on generating employment to absorb the pushed out labor 
caused by economic slow down, because of the crisis, actual unemployment appears 
to have risen by only small amounts1. On the other hand, employment has actually 
risen. The reason is that labour force participation has increased and absorption in 
agricultural sector. The increase in the labour force has come largely from women and 
children. However, the most significant labour market impact of the crisis has not 
                                                 
1 Peter Warr, “Indonesia’s Crisis and the Agricultural Sector”, Working Paper 99.07, 
ACIAR Indonesia research project, March 1999.  
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been on levels of unemployment or on labour force participation, but on real wages, 
which have fallen very significantly. These facts reflect the flexibility of Indonesia’s 
labour market. A collapse in the demand for labour has been expressed primarily in a 
decline in its price, rather than a decline in the level of employment. Behind these 
aggregate data, there has been a large sector reallocation of employment away from 
sectors of the economy that have contracted, and towards sector which have expanded, 
notably agriculture. 
Data from national economic survey, conducted in 1998 indicated that the rate 
of employment of the population aged 10 and above (labour force participation) 
increased from 56.3 in February 1997 to 57,4% in February 1998. This increase in 
labour force participation was most pronounced in urban areas. Almost all the new 
jobs were in agriculture. The national economic survey data also indicated that open 
unemployment increased from 5.1% in February 1997 to 6.4% one year later. On 
survey on 100 villages, it indicated that force participation for men had fallen slightly 
and that for women had risen. The more significant finding was large increase in 
hours worked for those employed. Average hours worked increased for both males 
and females but both the absolute increase in hours worked and the proportionate 
increase was significantly larger for females. 
The national economic survey data also provides information on employment 
by sector, which again reveal large changes in the composition of employment. 
Employment has shifted from urban to rural areas and from formal to informal jobs.  
The aggregate employment increased by 5.5%, most of this was in agriculture, where 
it expanded by 6.8%, while employment in other sectors all declined. 
Around 2.5 million workers, or 3% of the total work force displaced by the 
crisis in the first year. Job losses came from all sector of the economy outside 
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agriculture and the small transport and communication sector. Most displaced workers 
were employees, and men accounted for three quarters of all job losses. The 
manufacturing sector was easily the largest loser, accounting for nearly half of all job 
losses, followed by construction, and to a smaller extent by mining, trade and services. 
In this regard, the thesis will deeply discuss the role of agricultural sector to absorb 
job losses workers caused by the crisis and analyze policy issues taken by the 
Government of Indonesia. 
Purpose and scope of the thesis 
This thesis will discuss on the three objects. First, to examine the impact of the 
crisis on macroeconomic and employment. Second, to examine the role of agriculture 
sector to absorb the job losses workers from other sectors of the economy caused by 
the crisis. Third, to analyze some policy issues taken by the government in response to 
the crisis related to employment.  
The organization of the thesis is as follows. Section 2 discusses the impact of 
the crisis on macro-economy, agricultural sector and employment. This is followed by 
section 3 which will discuss about job losses caused by the crisis, employment 
absorption in agriculture, and changing on employment, living standards and real 
wages. In the section 4, some policy issues will be discussed. In this section also some 
recommendations are drawn. 
Methodology 
A. An assessment of the statistical base 
The main institutions producing current official labour statistics in Indonesia 
are the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and the Ministry of Labour. CBS conducts 
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on a regular basis two large scale household surveys, one dealing with employment 
and unemployment and the other with the socio-economic characteristics of the 
population. CBS also conducts regular surveys of large and medium size 
establishments in selected sectors of the economy dealing with industrial production 
and wages. Recently, they have started an integrated survey of small-scale 
establishments. 
In addition, a variety of small-scale surveys have been commissioned to CBS 
and other statistical agencies in the aftermath of the financial crisis by various 
national and international organizations to examine the impact of the crisis on the 
welfare and employment situation of the population. 
 Base on these source data, this thesis deeply analyses the impact of the 1997 
crisis regarding job losses and the role of agricultural sector to absorb employment in 
response to it. 
Apart from comparability, it is also important to distinguish the impact of a 
particular event/phenomenon from normal trend. A statistically significant change in 
an observed variable from one period to another should not be automatically 
attributed to an impact of the financial crisis. It may be part of a continuing trend that 
has been in effect for some time. For example, a decline in the male labour force 
participation rate from 1997 to 1998, even if statistically significant, should be 
assessed against its past trend as the labour force participation of men has been 
declining by about 0.1 percentage point a year in the last five years or so. Similarly, an 
increase in the female labour force participation rate from 1997 to 1998 may not 
necessarily reflect an “added worker” effect due to the financial crisis, as the labour 
force participation rate of women has been increasing by about 0.1 percentage points 
a year during the recent years. 
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B. Policy study 
The thesis also analyzes the policies which have been taken by the 
Government of Indonesia in response to the crisis on employment and policies related 
to the agricultural sector. The Government of Indonesia has been alive to the 
worsening situation on un-and underemployment in the wake of the economic crisis, 
and has undertaken a number of measures aimed at job creation. The present looks at 
program of direct wage employment creation, self-employment generation, and for 
promotion of small and medium enterprises. 
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Chapter II 
Impact of the 1997 Economic Crisis 
A. Impact on Macro-economy 
The impact of the crisis on Indonesian economy has been very severe in 
comparison to other countries in crisis. In less than a year the economic success which 
has been achieved by this country for the last thirty-two years of development has 
been torn apart very badly. This country that was previously ranked by the World 
Bank as the lower-middle income groups together with Thailand, Malaysia and other 
NIEs (Newly industrializing countries) now becomes as one of the poor country again. 
Some macroeconomic indicators prior to the crisis show that the country has an 
average high growth rate of 7 per cent per year between 1990-1996 with relative low 
inflation and there has been structural adjustment from agricultural based economy to 
industrial based economy, although there has been problems in terms of debt service 
ratio (DSR) and current account balances.  
As there have been many problems with the economy prior to the crisis 
(Firdausy, 1999), the economy becomes more unstable when the crisis hit the country. 
The collapse of the economy can be seen not only in terms of negative economic 
growth (-14% in 1998), but also in terms of other macroeconomic variables 
(consumption, government expenditure, investment, and imports). In terms of 
consumption variable by GDP contribution, for instance, the crisis has made both 
household and government consumption growth rate becoming negatives. The growth 
rate of household consumption by GDP between 1997 and 1998 become negative of 
4.9 per cent, whereas government consumption by GDP contribution was minus 15.3 
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per cent. Similarly, the growth of investment by GDP was minus 42.4 per cent, and 
import growth was minus 7.7 per cent. The only positive figure by GDP contribution 
was export variable (table 1). 
Table 1. 
GDP by Consumption, Government spending, Investment, Export and Import 
1997 and 1998 (at constant prices 1993) 
Description 1997           
(Rp. billion) 
1998        
(Rp. Billion) 
Percentage change 
1997-1998 
Consumption 173 917.4 260 368.3 -4.95 
Government Spending 31 700.8 26 839.9 -15.33 
Investment 139 724.8 80 525.9 -42.37 
Export 121 157.9 137 487.1 13.48 
Import 139 796.1 129 056.1 -7.68 
Total 434 095.5 374 516.6 -13.72 
Source: Calculated from National Survey of Social Economic, CBS, 1998. 
Table 2  
Real GDP growth by sector, 1997 and 1998 (Rp. billion at constant 1993 prices) 
Description 1997 1998 Growth (%) 
1. Agriculture 64 289.5 64 532.0 0.38 
2. Mining  38 385.9 37 101.7 -3.38 
3. Manufacturing  108 828.6 91 473.3 -15.95 
4. Utilities 5 498.6 5 576.8 1.42 
5. Construction 35 040.6 21 902.9 -37.49 
6. Trade and hotel  73 503.6 58 330.1 -20.64 
7. Transport 32 169 4 28 361.4 -11.84 
8. Finance 38 730.1 31 664.5 -18.24 
9. Other services 37 649.1 35 573.8 -5.51 
Total 434 095.4 374 516.5 -13.72 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistic, 1998.  
  Furthermore, In terms of the growth by economic sector at constant 1993 
prices, the crisis has made all sectors of the economy experienced substantial falls in 
activity in 1998, with the exception of agriculture and utilities. The sectors suffering 
the largest collapse have been construction, and trade and hotel. The growth of 
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construction sector in 1998 declined to minus 37.5 per cent, while trade and hotels fell 
to negative 20.6 per cent (table 2). 
Apart from the negative effect on macro economy of the country, the crisis 
also hit badly the economy at the micro level2 . Many firms have gone bankrupt 
simply because they fail to plan for an 80 per cent devaluation and a period of interest 
rates in excess of 100 per cent. This is because with a large collapse of the economy 
bankruptcies and sharp decrease in production of some firms have adverse effect on 
other firms, which have sound management, causing them in turn to go bankrupt.  
B. Impact on Agricultural Sector 
Agriculture cannot be described as a neglect sector of the Indonesia economy. 
Aggregate government spending as a proportion of the budget and as a proportion of 
the GDP are the highest in Southeast Asia and the rate of growth of yields has also 
been among the highest in Southeast Asia3. 
Among the ongoing concerns facing agricultural policymakers is what the 
devaluation means for food security and what can be done to minimize the negative 
consequences for both food production and access to food. The devaluation’s direct 
and indirect impacts on food consumers and producers work in opposing directions. 
For example, while agricultural wages represent an important cost component for 
food production, they are also the primary income source for many households. In 
part, the crisis shocks should encourage food production since drops in real wages 
                                                 
2 Carunia Mulya Firdausy, “The Impact of Economic Crisis on Employment in 
Indonesia”, Center for Economic and Development Studies–Indonesia Institute of 
Sciences, 1999. 
 
3  Peter Warr. “Indonesia’s Crisis and Agricultural Sector”, Working Paper 99.07, 
March 1999. 
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reduce food production costs, increase producer profits and provide incentives to 
boost production further through both extensive and intensive techniques. 
For wage-dependent landless workers, however, falling incomes reduce food 
demand, counteracting the production enhancing effects of lower production costs. 
Likewise, as the price of export crops increase relative to non-exported food crops, 
producers will shift land, labour and other inputs towards the more profitable 
opportunities.  
It is ironic that in Indonesia, agricultural households tend to be more 
vulnerable to food insecurity than urban residents. Before the crisis, the average per 
capita expenditure of agricultural households was about 57 percent higher than the 
poverty line (World Bank, 1998). In contrast, average per capita expenditure among 
households in both manufacturing and construction was more than twice the poverty 
line. Unskilled agricultural wages have fallen in real terms as urban workers whose 
jobs are lost in construction, manufacturing, and import-dependent food processing 
activities migrate back to the countryside to look for work. It will be discussed that 
this influx of labour into the countryside is placing downward pressure on agricultural 
wages.  
The devaluation provides increased opportunities for expanding traditional 
exports crops (cocoa beans, coffee, tea and fishery and forestry products), as well as 
exports of fruits and vegetables. As prices of vegetables increase relative to rice prices, 
producers will tend to substitute vegetables for rice production. The price ratio of 
paddy to agricultural wages has changed significantly compared with the price ratio of 
vegetables to agricultural wages. As the relative output prices of these two 
commodities continue to diverge, policymakers attempting to control rice prices 
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through generalized subsidies will find it increasingly difficult to compensate rice 
producers via input subsidies. 
The increasing food prices and falling real input costs stimulate production 
and agricultural income, but reduce the real income, effective demand and food 
security situation of landless agricultural workers and consumers who depend on the 
market for their food supplies. For agricultural workers, declining real wages harm 
their ability to feed their families, to school their children, and to provide adequate 
health care. 
The crisis exactly contributed to a significant increase in absolute poverty: (1) 
a fall in average real incomes, (2) a rise in urban unemployment; estimated to be as 
high as 15 million persons, and (3) a rise in food prices facing the poor. 
The impact has long-term consequences for future income, agricultural 
productivity and production possibilities. Many households respond to negative 
economic shocks by pulling their children out of school. The World Bank estimated 
17.5 million school age children (out of a total 53 million) in 1997 were reported to be 
out of school to earn an income. Even with the planned abolition of school fees, these 
numbers will undoubtedly rise as the increased opportunity cost of keeping children in 
school rises. The government estimates suggest that about 6 percent of primary school 
students and 13 percent of junior secondary school students are at risk of dropping out 
(approximately 1,650,000 and 1,100,000 students respectively), while an additional 
400,000 primary school graduates are unlikely to continue their education (World 
Bank, 1998). The drop in enrolment levels raises serious medium and long term 
growth implications for Indonesia’s economy.  
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C. Impact on Employment 
1. Pre-crisis employment  
The effects of the rapid economic growth and associated policies before the 
economic crisis in mid 1997 have been favorable to labor, in terms of improved 
welfare, security and equity across the country. As can be seen at table 3, the 
proportion of overall open unemployment rate declined from 4.9 % in 1996 to 4.7 in 
1997. On the supply side, the growth labor force declined from 2.5% in 1996 to 1.4 
percent in 1997. Similarly, the employment growth slowed down from 2.2% in 1996 
to 1.6% in 1997. With GDP growth during 1990s over going 8%, average labor 
productivity grew at just under 6% per annum until mid 1997. 
Although there was significant improvement in the structure of employment  
and earnings before crisis, it does not necessary mean that there are no problems with 
the labor markets. Even before the crisis hit Indonesia in 1997, the labor market of the 
country was characterized by a high degree of under employment and continued 
predominance of the informal sector. While significant change had taken place in the 
structure of employment (i.e., away from agriculture), the rate of employment growth 
was lower than that of labour force. And the rate of employment growth declined in 
1990s. Youth unemployment, especially in the urban areas, was already a problem in 
Indonesia before the crisis. Manning (1998) observed that there are at least three 
problems, namely, a high proportion of employment in low productivity, a large 
traditional and mainly rural non-agricultural sector in which family and micro 
enterprises dominated and returns were commonly much lower than daily wages in 
agriculture, and a tiny modern sector, especially outside government (and military) 
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employment, epitomized by a very small proportion of professional and other white-
collar and educated workers. 
Table 3 
Unemployment, Employment and Wages, 1992-1997 
Indicator 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997 
Open unemployment -  4.4 4.9 4.7 
% Labor Force  - - 3.7 4.4 4.3 
Labor Force (in Million) 5.6 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.6 
Underemployment (<35 hours/week) 40.5 39.6 39.2 38.9 36.6 
Employment growth 2.7 0.9 3.6 2.2 1.6 
Labor Force Group 2.9 0.9 5.3 2.5 1.4 
Population growth (age 10+) 2.5 2.1 2.8 2.2 1.9 
GDP growth 7.3 9.1 7.5 8.0 4.6 
Productivity growth  4.5 8.2  3.8 5.7  3.0 
Real wages Growth 8.6 12.3 0.0 6.6 4.2 
Source: National Labor Force Survey and National Socio-Economic Survey, CBS. 
  Therefore, it could be concluded that the strong economic performance before 
crisis was accompanied by significant gains in employment and labor income, and 
economic growth was employment friendly to a surprising extent. However, there are 
still problems associated with the labor market change before the crisis in mid 1997. 
Formal sector employment in the country still lagged in response to economic change. 
The agricultural sector still continued to absorb unskilled workers, informal sector 
work widespread and continued to grow in the cities and rural self-employed and 
family work still contributed a major share of total employment.  
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2. Employment during the crisis time 
Employment situation in the crisis period was very much different in 
comparison with before the crisis. The economic crisis, in its first year, did not lead to 
a massive increase in open employment as was feared by many. The rate from 4.7% 
in 1997 to 5.4% in 1998 (CBS 1999). However, the degree of underemployment and 
reliance on informal sector increased. This has implications for productivity and 
earnings of large number of workers who had to move the formal to informal segment 
of the economy as well as those who were already forced to eke out their living from 
low productivity jobs in the latter. There was thus a reversal of gains made in term of 
reduced underemployment and shift in the structure of the employment (towards 
manufacturing and away from agriculture). 
Table 4. 
Number of employment by sector, 1997 and 1998 (million) 
Description 1997 1998 1998 – 1997 
1. Agriculture 34 789 927 39 414 765 4 624 838 
2. Mining  875 280 674 597 -200 683 
3. Manufacturing  11 008 951 9 933 622 -1 075 329 
4. Utilities 233 237 147 849 -85 388 
5. Construction 4 184 970 3 521 682 -663 288 
6. Trade and hotel  16 953 006 16 814 233 -138 773 
7. Transport 4 125 429 4 153 707 28 278 
8. Finance 656 724 617 722 -39 002 
9. Other services 12 578 005 12 394 272 -180 572 
Total 85 405 529 87 672 449 2 270 081 
Source: National Labour Force Survey, 1998, CBS. 
From table 4, it can be seen that the crisis has given a great impact on 
manufacturing sector, followed by construction sector and mining sector. The 
agricultural and transport sectors have been able to survive. These sectors (especially 
agriculture) were even able to absorb the workers retrenched from other sector. This 
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suggests that the agricultural sector has been the important sector to absorb retrench 
workers from other sectors. And hence, this sector should be more developed in the 
future economic development in the country. 
Regarding the average of hours of employment in the economic sector, on the 
average, it was calculated that in 1997 the average hours of Indonesian workers for a 
week was 40.9 hours, while in 1998 it increased to 41.08 hours per week. This 
suggests that in the crisis time the workers slightly worked harder than before crisis as 
they need to find more earnings to fulfill their daily needs which increased due to 
crisis (table 5). 
Table 5. 
Average hours per week of Employment by Sector 1997 and 1998 (Hours) 
Sectors  1997 1998 
1. Agriculture 40.86 40.86 
2. Mining  40.81 40.69 
3. Manufacturing  41.10 41.24 
4. Utilities 41.17 41.27 
5. Construction 41.25 41.99 
6. Trade and hotel  41.04 41.27 
7. Transport 41.09 41.39 
8. Finance 41.23 41.54 
9. Other services 41.07 41.11 
Average 40.99 41.08 
Source: National Accounting System Survey, 1997 and 1998, CBS. 
  However, although the workers have worked more hours than before the crisis, 
the income earnings of workers in 1998 have been relative lower than in 1997. As can 
be seen at table 6 the average income per employment equivalent decreased from Rp. 
3.7 million in 1997 to Rp. 3.5 million in 1998, although the workers have increased 
their average hours of worked per week. This implies that wage of the workers 
decreased from Rp. 70.7 thousand per week in 1997 to Rp. 68 thousands per week in 
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1998. Hence, the crisis has made the workers' average incomes lower than before the 
crisis. The implication of this finding is that there will be a declining purchasing 
power of the workers in the crisis time. 
Table 6.  
Average Wage per Employment Equivalent per Year By Sector, 1997 and 1998  
Sectors 1997 (Rp. thousand) 1998 (Rp. thousand) 
1. Agriculture 2 230.55 2 058.95 
2. Mining  14 304.69 18 764.44 
3. Manufacturing  4 635.48 5 607.22 
4. Utilities 6 114.07 7 428.51 
5. Construction 5 153.93 5 799.32 
6. Trade and hotel  3 824.89 4 133.66 
7. Transport  3 155.38 3 212.56 
8. Finance 24 315.72 21 400.19 
9. Other services 3 478.37 2 833.75 
Average 3 673.96 3 533.72 
Source: Calculated from National Accounting System Survey, 1997 and 1998, CBS. 
In addition to the adjustments in employment and wage rates, there were 
labor market adjustments, which have contributed to preventing the unemployment 
rate from escalating, have occurred4. This note briefly discusses some of these factors. 
 There has been a shift in employment from the formal to the informal sector. 
Table 7 shows the employment share of the informal sector in 1997 and 1998, 
revealing that informal sector employment share increased from 62.8 percent in 1997 
to 65.4 percent in 1998. When gender is taken into account, the increase was larger 
for male workers, but in both years the proportion of female workers operating in the 
informal sector has been significantly higher than male workers. Comparing urban 
and rural areas, the increase in the employment share of the informal sector was larger 
                                                 
4 SMERU Indonesia, “Labor Market Adjustment as a Response to the Crisis”, No. 7, 
1999. 
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in urban areas, although throughout the whole period the proportion of workers in 
rural areas in the informal sector has been much higher than in urban areas.  
Table 7 
Employment Share of the Informal Sector (%) 
 1997 1998
Total 62.8 65.4
Male 58.3 61.6
Female 70.2 71.5
Urban 42.8 45.7
Rural 73.3 75.8
   Source: National Labour Force Survey 1998, CBS. 
There has been a shift in sectoral employment back to agriculture. Table 8 
shows the employment share of the agriculture and non-agriculture sectors in 1997 
and 1998. It reveals that the proportion of those working in the agriculture sector 
increased substantially, from 40.8 percent in 1997 to 45 percent in 1998. On the other 
hand, the share of non-agriculture sectors employment shrank from 59.30 percent to 
55.00 percent during the same period. This shifting pattern of sectoral employment is 
true for both male and female workers as well as in urban and rural areas.  
Table 8 
 Employment Shares of the Agriculture and Non-agriculture Sectors (%) 
Agriculture Non agriculture 
 
1997 1998 1997 1998 
Total 40.7 45.00 59.30 55.00 
Male 40.3 44.30 59.70 55.70 
Female 41.8 46.00 58.20 54.00 
Urban 7.90 11.10 92.10 88.90 
Rural 57.90 62.90 42.10 37.10 
Source: National Labour Force Survey 1998, CBS. 
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It is apparent that there has been an adjustment in the number of hours that 
people are working. Table 9 shows the proportions of those who worked more than 35 
hours per week and those who worked less than 15 hours per week in both 1997 and 
1998. Those who worked more than 35 hours per week declined from 64.2 percent in 
1997 to 60.9 percent in 1998, while those who worked less than 15 hours per week 
increased from 9.6 percent to 10.5 percent during the same period. This adjustment in 
working hours holds equally for both male and female workers as well as in both 
urban and rural areas. Falling real wages may induce workers to compensate by 
working longer hours. This, however, is constrained by falling labor demand. Those 
who worked less than 15 hours increased as absorbed in agricultural and informal 
sector. 
Table 9 
Proportions of Workers by Hours of Work (%) 
>35 hours/week <15 hours/week 
 
1997 1998 1997 1998
Total 64.2 60.9 9.6 10.5
Male 73.5 70.4 5.7 6.3
Female 49 45.6 16 17.1
Urban 79.1 75.9 5.7 6.4
Rural 56.4 53 11.6 12.7
    Source: National Labour Force Survey 1998, CBS 
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Chapter III 
 
Job Losses and Employment Absorption 
 
A. Job Losses 
The manufacturing sector has been amongst the hardest hit by the sharp fall 
in real wages. Real wages in manufacturing declined by 37.7 percent in 1998, 
compared with 32.2 percent in services, and 26.6 percent in agricultural sector5. Sharp 
reduction in employment has also taken place in the manufacturing sector, so that the 
real labour remained relatively constant.  
Within the manufacturing sector, the decline in employment shows large 
number variation among sub-sector, with the highly import-dependent manufacturing 
sub-sectors the most affected. Large number of workers from these sectors have been 
laid off and moved to other sectors, especially to the agricultural sector and other 
natural resource-based sector and or regions. The agricultural sector, helped by the 
boom in export oriented crops such as palm oil, cocoa and coffee in various regions or 
island appear to have absorbed many workers dismissed from the manufacturing 
sector. There is evidence that regions that are resource abundant and produce export 
commodities have benefited from the depreciation of the real exchange rate. What 
seemed to be occurring in the manufacturing sector is the transition from 
manufactured export dependent on imported inputs to natural resource-based 
production. The employment impact follows the same pattern of industrial 
restructuring. 
Job losses in manufacturing sector exceeded 1.0 million persons or nearly 
half of all job losses, around 60% of whom were male (table.10). Around three 
                                                 
5 ILO-Jakarta Office, “Indonesia Employment Strategy Mission”, Aide Memoire, 
1999. 
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quarters of displacement in this sector were in rural areas. The decline in 
manufacturing employment was not limited to the relatively industrialized provinces. 
This is because the majority of workers in this sector, 60%, are own account workers 
or family workers, many engaged in small-scale and household manufacturing, and 
relying on sales to the general population whose purchasing power has been greatly 
eroded due to inflation. 
Construction is the second sector which is the most affected during the crisis. 
Job losses in this sector nearly 0.7 million mainly male workers, or nearly a third of 
all job losses (table 10). As in the case of manufacturing sector, three quarters of these 
job losses occurred in rural areas.  
The other affected sectors were mining, trade and services, with nearly 0.2 
million-job losses each. Two thirds of job losses in trade consisted of female workers, 
while male accounted for virtually all job losses in the service sector. In urban areas, 
some displaced workers from the manufacturing and construction sectors found 
refuge in the informal trade and service sectors, thus increasing urban employment in 
these sector about 0.2 million. However, this was insufficient to compensate for the 
0.4 million jobs shed by the rural trade sector. As in the case of manufacturing, the 
decline in trade and service sector employment were quite general and have the same 
order of magnitude as for the country as a whole. 
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Table 10 
 
Job Losses and Employment Absorption in Agriculture 
 
Employment 
Changes 
By Gender 
(%) 
By Location 
(%) 
Sector 
(million) % Male Female Urban Rural 
1. Agriculture 4.625 100 57 43 23 77 
2. Manufacturing -1.075 46 58 42 29 71 
3. Construction -0.663 28 98 2 27 73 
4. Mining -0.201 9 61 39 (7) 107 
5. Trade and hotel -0.139 6 37 63 (166) 266 
6. Finance -0.039 2 90 10 38 62 
7. Utilities -0.085 4 97 3 91 9 
8. Transport 0.028 -1 40 60 207 (107) 
9. Other Services -0.184 8 97 3 (104) 204 
Non Agriculture -2.358 100 73 27 4 96 
 
Source: National Labour Force Survey 1998, CBS. 
Note: figure in ( ) means job gains in non-agricultural sector 
 
B. Employment Absorption in Agricultural Sector 
While the initial impact of the economic crisis on employment was faced by a 
few sectors of the economy, the real effect gradually spread to cover almost all 
branches of the economy. It appears that the employment effect has not been 
manifested in terms of persistent high unemployment, but has mostly been expressed: 
first, by a large movement of workers from manufacturing, construction, modern trade 
and other services into agricultural and possibly informal sector employment at 
reduced wage rates. Second, by an overall decline of real earning for virtually 
everyone, whether in the effected sectors or in others. These features are considered to 
be signs of the flexibility of the labour market in Indonesia. 
Employment in agriculture increased by nearly 5 million, or 6% of the 
workforce, most of it supply-driven. Workers displaced by the crisis from all other 
sectors of the economy accounted for nearly half of this growth, while the other half 
consisted of new entrants into the labor force. The latter in turn consisted of young, 
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first time labour market elements, and other, mainly women moved from 
housekeeping to work to cope with the crisis. Rural household formed most, nearly 
80%, of the new employment in agriculture. However, urban household accounted for 
the remaining 20% of new employment, presumably because they sent out some of 
their family members to work on the farms.  
 In addition to displaced workers, new entrants into the labor force were mainly 
absorbed in agriculture. The working age grew by 3.5 million persons, or 2.6% 
between 1997 and 1998, a continuation of previous trends. A stable employment rate 
of just over 63% over the last years translates itself into over 2 million additional 
labour market entrants every year. This consisted for a large part of teenagers turning 
15 and being officially counted in the work force for the first time. Finally, nearly 0.7 
million persons outside the labour force, and previously engaged in housekeeping and 
other activities, also joined the work force mainly in agriculture. 
 Manufacturing employment, which had reached 13% of total employment in 
1997, dropped back 2% to 11%, while employment in trade and services declined by 
1% each (20% to 19% in trade and 15% to 14% in services). The gender ratio did not 
change however, because men accounted for nearly 60% of all additional employment 
in agriculture even though they accounted for most job losses in non-agricultural 
sectors. Similarly, the urban-rural shares of employment did not change, because most 
additional employment was located in agriculture in rural areas, compensating for 
most net job losses in rural areas.  
The overall rise in employment of nearly 2.5 million in 1997-98 was the 
result of two opposite movement, namely, job losses in non-agricultural sectors of 
nearly 2.5 million, losses which were more than compensated by employment 
absorption in agriculture sector of double this magnitude at nearly 5.0 million workers 
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(3.0 million males, 2.0 million males). As a result, the steady decline in the share of 
agriculture in total employment, from 44% to 41% between 1996 and 1997, was 
reversed to reach 45% in 1998, while the share of virtually all non-agriculture sectors 
declined correspondingly (table 11). 
Table 11 
 
Structural Change in Employment 
 
Person (million) %  
1994 1996 1997 1998 1994 1996 1997 1998 
By sector         
1. Agriculture 36.51 36.50 34.79 39.42 45.6 43.5 40.7 45.0 
2. Non Agriculture 43.53 47.40 50.62 48.26 54.4 56.5 59.3 55.0 
- Manufacturing.  10.59 10.57 11.01 9.93 13.2 12.6 12.9 11.3 
- Construction 3.54 3.78 4.18 3.52 4.4 4.5 4.9 4.0 
- Mining 0.72 0.75 0.87 0.67 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.8 
- Trade and Hotel 13.72 15.84 16.95 16.81 17.1 18.9 19.9 19.2 
- Finance 0.62 0.69 0.66 0.62 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 
- Utilities 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.15 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
- Transport 3.36 3.94 4.12 4.15 4.2 4.7 4.8 4.7 
- Other services 10.79 11.67 12.58 12.39 13.5 13.9 14.7 14.1 
By Location         
Urban 24.04 27.43 29.35 30.30 30.0 32.7 34.4 34.6 
Rural 56.02 56.47 56.05 57.37 70.0 67.3 65.6 65.4 
By Gender         
Male 49.14 51.91 53.00 53.90 61.4 61.9 62.1 61.5 
Female 30.90 31.99 32.40 33.77 38.6 38.1 37.9 38.5 
By Status          
Wage Employment 26.79 28.70 30.28 28.80 33.5 34.2 35.5 32.9 
Non-Wage Employment 53.25 55.20 55.13 58.87 66.5 65.8 64.5 67.1 
Source: National Labour Force Survey, CBS.  
Both wage and non-wage employment increased in agriculture. Wage 
employment rose by about 0.5 million, nearly all accounted for new urban workers 
probably employed as hired agricultural labours, and benefited equally both male and 
female workers. However since non-wage employment increased even faster, mostly 
in the self-employment category which employs occasional hired labours as well as 
family labour, the share of wage employment fell slightly, from 13.4% to 13.0% in 
this sector. Outside agriculture, wage employment fell nearly by 2 million. A third of 
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these each come from manufacturing and construction, while another tenth originated 
in the trade sector. Nearly two third of losses in wage employment originated in rural 
areas, where, in addition to the manufacturing and construction, the service sector 
accounted for a quarter of the losses in wage employment. 
 
C. Real Wages and Living Standards. 
With refer to the table 12, nominal earnings of employees increased by less 
than 20% in the first year of the crisis, while consumer prices for workers rose by 
100% between August 1997 and August 1998. Real earnings therefore fell by 40% in 
this period, Subsequent wage surveys of the modern manufacturing and hotel sectors 
indicate that employers may have frozen pay rises between September 1998 and 
December 1998. Nominal wages in rural areas rose somewhat more than in urban 
areas, due to a more than average increase of the pay of agricultural labours. Male and 
female workers were equally affected in aggregate. Female workers in rural areas did 
not benefited from the same pay increase as their male counterparts. However, they 
did obtain higher pay rises in urban areas. 
Wages increases varied considerably by sector of the economic activity. The 
table shows that agricultural earnings increased almost twice as rapidly at over 30% 
compared with the average rise of 17% per annum. This may in part be due to the 
very low, survival level earnings in this sector (US$ 0.65 per day in 1998), which was 
only half of the average in earnings in sectors such as manufacturing and construction. 
Without substantial increases in their earnings in the face of rapid inflation in the price 
of good, the labours receive their wages in kind. On the other hand, the increase in the 
earnings of manufacturing and construction workers was below average at just 11% 
and 15% respectively, while service sector earnings, for males but not for females, 
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were slightly above average at 20% per annum. 
Table 12.  
Nominal Average Monthly Earnings of Employees (Rp./month)  
Rupiah/Month Index (1997=100) 
  
1998 1997 1996 1994 1998 1997 1996 1994 
Urban + Rural 282 251 240 732 207 108 157 343 117 100 86 65 
  Male 314 306 266 826 230 735 176 834 118 100 86 66 
  Female 215 528 183 042 153 737 113 497 118 100 84 62 
Urban 328 003 288 498 247 657 194 337 114 100 86 67 
  Male 365 069 322 168 276 447 219 422 113 100 86 68 
  Female 255 289 219 398 186 600 142 221 116 100 85 65 
Rural 227 208 186 753 162 056 120 579 122 100 87 65 
  Male 255 789 207 335 182 003 136 557 123 100 88 66 
  Female 163 211 137 127 113 638 81 585 119 100 83 59 
By sectors          
Agriculture 155 148 118 550 106 695 82 985 131 100 90 70 
Manufacturing 253 300 228 198 191 686 141 483 111 100 84 62 
Construction 279 300 242 870 211 297 165 152 115 100 87 68 
Trade and Hotel 279 200 232 667 207 074 162 867 120 100 89 70 
Services 333 600 282 712 237 478 183 763 118 100 84 65 
Deflator (1996=100) 
Urban (CPI) 
204.31 106.35 98.38 81.48 192 100 93 77 
  Source: National Labour Force Survey, CBS 
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Table 13.  
Real Average Monthly Earnings of Employees (Rp./month)  
Rupiah/Month Index (1997=100) 
  
1998 1997 1996 1994 1998 1997 1996 1994 
Urban +Rural 138 148 226 358 210 518 193 106 61 100 93 85 
  Male 153 838 250 894 234 534 217 027 61 100 93 87 
  Female 105 491 172 113 156 269 139 294 61 100 91 81 
Urban 160 542 271 272 251 735 238 509 59 100 93 88 
  Male 178 684 302 932 280 999 269 296 59 100 93 89 
  Female 124 952 206 298 189 673 174 547 61 100 92 85 
Rural 111 207 175 602 164 725 147 986 63 100 94 84 
  Male 125 197 194 955 185 000 167 596 64 100 95 86 
  Female 79 884 128 939 115 509 100 129 62 100 90 78 
By sectors          
Agriculture 74 300 114 308 109 734 101 734 65 100 96 89 
Manufacturing 121 300 216 429 194 786 170 979 56 100 90 79 
Construction 133 600 230 345 211 917 198 077 58 100 92 86 
Trade and Hotel 133 600 222 667 211 534 195 947 60 100 95 88 
Services 159 600 270 508 243 457 221 817 59 100 90 82 
  Source: National Labour Force Survey, CBS. 
Related to the poverty profile, according to Meno Pradhan, et al (2000), the 
agriculture consistently have the highest poverty incidence as well as the highest 
contribution to the total number of poor people. This reflect two things, first, people 
in the agricultural sector have always been relatively poorer than those in other 
sectors. Therefore, even though this sector was not hit by the crisis as hard as modern 
sectors, in the end the poverty incidence in this sector still the highest of all sectors. 
Second, the agricultural sector remain the largest sector in term of employment. In 
fact, during crisis many workers who were laid off in modern sectors returned to 
agriculture, so that between 1997 and 1998 the employment’s share increased from 
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40.7 percent to 45 percent. This combination of these two factors explains persistence 
of agricultural sector as the largest contribution to the number of poor people, even 
though its importance has declined markedly.  
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Chapter IV 
Policy Issues and Recommendations  
 
A. Policy Issues 
The Government of Indonesia has been alive to the worsening situation on un-
and underemployment in the wake of the economic crisis, and has undertaken a 
number of measures aimed at job creation. The present looks at program of direct 
wage employment creation, self-employment generation, and for promotion of small 
and medium enterprises. 
1. Direct wage employment creation. 
Labour- intensive job creation program run measure for poverty alleviation 
through employment generation had been in vague in Indonesia since the early 
seventies and the eighties. Recently, this program had the added objective of creating 
social capital as well. The target beneficiaries of this labour- intensive sub programs 
varied from the new and the poor people, also retrenched worker as well as other 
unemployed. 
One of the major problems that the recent package of labour- intensive 
programs suffered from was poor targeting, and much of the inadequacy of the 
program in this area stemmed from lack of conceptual clarity about objectives and 
poor programs design which did not take into account the ground conditions. For 
instance, it should have been abundantly clear that in the absence of a functioning 
decentralized labour market information system, it would not be easy to identify the 
target group of beneficiaries of labour- intensive. The near - total absence of effective 
community involvement would have simply aggravated the problem. Under the 
circumstances, the best option would have been to allow for self - targeting especially 
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in case of unskilled labour, so that the really impoverished ones, would self - select 
themselves for work, provided the work sites are chosen carefully. For such a system 
to work effectively, the offered wage rates need to be kept low, for otherwise, the 
really needy and the unemployed may be elbowed out by some who would take up 
labour- intensive work simply because it offers them employment at wage rates higher 
than what they would have been earning in their current jobs. In most successful 
labour–intensive public works programs, wage rates are normally kept low in order to 
net in the really poor and the needy, and to keep out those with higher reservation 
wages.  
A large number of labour- intensive projects also happened to have too low a 
wage bill as compared to material and other costs. This is again a design problem. 
Even in highly capital intensive infrastructure projects there may exist a large 
untapped potential for increasing the labour intensity of public works programs 
without compromising on the quality of the works, simply by identifying activities, 
sometimes peripheral, but generally essential, which can deploy large quantities of 
labour. 
The labour-intensive programs also exhibited a very low incidence of 
participation of women workers. Indonesian women from most parts, are generally 
not involved in construction activities, so that construction labour- intensive programs 
have registered very little women's involvement. However a range of activities, 
especially in the area of social capital, can be identified which can be highly women 
intensive. Thus by careful planning and design, many of the shortcomings of the 
recent labour-intensive programs could have been revoked. 
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2. Self-employment generation and the role of micro finance 
The lower end of the self - employment sector in Indonesia has over the years 
absorbed the surplus manpower from agriculture that has not been able to get into the 
fast growing modern sector. Yet there has been little official recognition of the shock 
- absorbing and self–adjusting role the informal sector has played in the process of 
transition of the national economy. On the contrary, a range of policy interventions, 
including fiscal and regulatory measures have been systematically geared against the 
interests of the self - employed segments at the bottom ends of the market. Regulatory 
monopolies affecting the production and trade in a large range of agricultural 
commodities for instance have generally worked against the interests of the self - 
employed. Faulty pricing and fiscal policies have virtually decimated small producers 
and traders in some markets, as in the case of cane products. Indiscriminate taxes and 
levies rose by local governments, ad hoc regulations on local trade and transport, and 
a range of statutory licensing requirements and restrictions on production and 
marketing of products have posed serious problems for the small producer and 
businessman.  
 Lack of access to working capital is recognized to be the major constraint for 
this category of the workforce. Experience from the world over suggests that this also 
happens to be an area, which is readily amenable to a successful micro - intervention 
strategy. It is therefore necessary to develop a comprehensive policy on micro finance 
as an essential component of the promotion of self - employment strategy for the poor. 
The rural credit sector in Indonesia over the last couple of decades has evolved 
in response to financial policy reforms and has undergone rapid changes that have 
swept through the sector during the recent crisis. By and large, most credit 
instruments are not accessible to the assetless poor since most require collaterals, or 
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are geared to those who have access to regular incomes. The self - employed at the 
lower rungs of income scales continue to depend heavily on informal credit sources. 
However there are a number of micro finance instruments outside the informal credit 
market, which do cater to the credit needs of the poor self - employed in different 
regions of Indonesia. One salient feature of all these micro credit instruments is that 
they all carry high interest rates.  
The existing micro finance programs in the country illustrate that while 
government or donors need to provide initial subsidies, such programs, if properly 
managed, have the capability of breaking even within a few years and go on to 
provide a valuable service to low income households. By proper designing and 
institution of measures such as provision of incentives for staff and clients, repayment 
rates can be kept high even with high interest rates. In fact, such programs have 
demonstrated that contrary to popular belief, subsidized credit is not required, nor 
even recommended for strong financial performance. Provision of subsidized credit, 
which is often extended under political consideration, may in fact undermine the 
healthy functioning of these institutions. With the help of a contingent of field staff, 
these programs can reach clients in remote and relatively inaccessible areas. One of 
the major strengths of these programs is also the considerable outreach it has among 
women borrowers in low income households. These programs have been providing 
them with the much needed working capital, primarily for petty trading activities, at 
high but affordable rates – much lower still than the implicit rates charged in informal 
credit markets. 
  There is therefore an urgent need to rationalize the existing programs and 
develop a comprehensive national micro finance policy. 
3. Promoting small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
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At the moment, there is a plethora of programs. Technical programs can be 
divided into five broad categories: i) assistance with marketing; ii) assistance with 
inputs; iii) assistance with manufacturing/processing; iv) assistance with the 
regulatory environment; and v) assistance with linkages to other firms.  
A more detailed review of policies and many government programs show a 
great deal of duplication and overlap. Such duplication represents waste in scarce 
resources and leads to inter-agency inefficiencies. More importantly, over the last 
thirty years a complex legal and regulatory system has developed and this places a 
great burden on SMEs. This high cost of doing business is particularly heavy on 
SMEs when the inefficiencies are in the form of fixed costs. SMEs generally pay a 
large proportion of their income in fixed regulatory costs–the burden of taxation and 
licensing requirements in all forms falls most heavily on them. At present Indonesia 
has a complex set of overlapping laws, rules, regulations, licenses and fees that 
constrain SME development. 
For promoting the growth of SMEs, both macro and sector-specific policy 
reforms in trade, fiscal, monetary and regulatory frameworks and regimes should be 
emphasized over specific targeted programs. More significantly, programs that favor 
SMEs should not be used to compensate for existing or remaining policy distortions, 
rather any policies causing the distortions first should be reformed. This is in keeping 
with an increasing reliance on market mechanisms but also with the principal of 
putting in place complementary sets of public policy initiatives that can encourage the 
better functioning of market mechanisms while also trying to compensate for any 
market failures. 
A second strategic orientation therefore should be the design and 
implementation of appropriate institutional packages to focus on four fundamental 
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area of need and support to SMEs: i) developing conducive policy, legal, regulatory, 
competition, business and trading environment in each sector; ii) developing better 
access to credit and financial services; iii) developing access to the most appropriate 
range of general and sector and locality-specific business services; and iv) developing 
innovative links between urban and rural markets, relevant inter-sectoral linkages, and  
backward and forward production and trade linkages among large and small domestic 
firms and between domestic and international firms to stimulate demand. These four 
policy thrusts can be useful and beneficial particularly if certain strategic conditions 
are observed in their prioritization and implementation.  
 
B. Recommendations. 
There are still significant policy and institutional constraints on efficient 
growth and development that must be addressed especially related to agricultural 
sector. Market reform in general is needed in agriculture to reduce the public burden 
in the face of the economic crisis, to reduce high distribution costs and improve 
allocation efficiency. They can lead to increase production, higher productivity, higher 
rural wages and employment and improve using of natural resources. 
The crisis gives at least five tasks to agricultural sector: (i) by compensating 
industrial sector which is predicted to have negative growth, (ii) to generate 
employment to absorb the pushed out labour caused by economic slowdown, (iii) 
food supplier, (iv) foreign exchange generator, and (v) poverty alleviator. In this 
regard, agriculture based labour intensive industry in particular, hold central position 
for several reason. In this thesis has been deeply discussed as evidence, that 
agricultural sector’s role specifically to absorb employment during the crisis time. So 
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that in the future this sector really need to be developed and emphasized in the 
economic policies. Some reasons recommend here: 
1. Comparative advantages. Widely accepted international trade theory says that 
two countries will gain a mutual benefit if they trade their products that use 
their abundant resource endowment intensively. If this theory is true, 
Indonesia should give more attention to labor intensive and agricultural based 
industry since it has abundance endowment of its required resources. Recent 
depreciation gives greater opportunity for Indonesia to boost export. There is 
no reason to be afraid that by concentrating on simple technology industries, 
Indonesia will be locked on its simple technology and easily dictated by 
developed countries. Comparative advantage is a dynamic process which 
changes over time in line with the change of the structure of resource 
endowment. On the contrary,  trading based on its comparative advantages will 
lessen the risk of retaliation from other countries that may be worsen off by a 
protective trade policies. 
2. Narrowing economic or income gaps, both individual and regional. Indonesian 
last three decades development program unexpectedly led to imbalance 
structural economic transformation. The decrease of agricultural sector’s share 
on GDP does not proportionally accompanied by the decrease of employment. 
This implies agricultural income decrease relative to that of industry. In 
addition, increasing agricultural land conversion to non-agriculture worsen the 
situation, creating rural unemployment either disguised, semi, or even open 
unemployment. Rural agricultural industry may fill the gap. Furthermore, the 
increase of rural economy will also increase urban economy, not the other way 
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around. Concentrated economic activities in urban area will lead to 
urbanization problems and other social disharmonies. 
3. Its positive backward linkage effects. Agriculture based rural industry will 
increase agricultural sector activities, the sector where majority Indonesian 
people relied on, as input supplier. Actually, Indonesian labor- intensive 
industries, such as textile and its products, and foot-ware manufacturing 
industries, have increased significantly. However, this type of industries has 
less backward linkage to agriculture. These industries, which are coming 
through foreign direct investment, are usually relocated industries which are 
already loosing their comparative advantages in their countries of origins.  
4. It strengthens the fundamental of the economy. The industries which consists 
of many small scale industries will have stronger economic fundamental 
compared to that of the economy relied on few conglomerates, leading to a 
great difficulty in doing economic reform when they have political influences. 
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